таджикистан, душанбе хисор

What the ICG is/was worrying about (the occasional fighting since 2008) are/were security operations on the periphery to bring down the last recalcitrant commanders, not a fight that will lead to guys with big beards marching through Dushanbe. And why the hype over the actual fighting? Mullah Abdullo is dead, Ali Bedaki is dead, Mirzo Ziyoev is long dead and Mirzokhuja Ahmadov (the opposition commander turned police chief) turned on the anti-government forces. The ICG maintains that “The deal with Akhmadov seems more like a surrender of authority than a cunning political move. Akhmadov remains the areaвІ s power broker.” The government has been doing this for years, and these temporary deals have served them well in the face of no better alternatives. I would think that Ahmadov might see the fate of Abdullo, Bedaki and Ziyoev and decide that he is too old for this sort of thing.

Pic from 2006: Reading the laws of warfare up in the hills (via ):

During the war the Rasht region, despite coming right next to the capital, was never a launching-pad for any force significant enough to threaten the regime. In fact, the most significant threat was from an unhappy ally (Khudoyberdiev). How about more recently? Well, the chance that any of those grumpy commanders (Ahmadov, Ali Bedaki, Ziyoev, Mullah Abdullo, etc…) could have left their high valley base of operations and threatened the government’s hold of the country were about as good as Tajikistan’s chance of winning the World Cup are presently.

The ICG takes pains to point out that the Rasht region, which they define broadly to include places such as Darvoz/Tavildara, is “highly attractive terrain for any guerrilla organisation.” I would say instead that it was the only option for the opposition as they were heavily defeated in the areas they focused their initial efforts on: Dushanbe and the Vakhsh Valley.

So why was Rasht left so late? Because it is so insignificant. The north, Dushanbe and Hisor/Tursunzoda have the overwhelming large share of industry and economic assets, while the Vakhsh Valley and Tajikistan’s piece of the Ferghana Valley hold the lion’s share of the country’s agricultural output. Rasht is the periphery. There is really not much to speak of up there. It was not worth it for the government or their self-interested commanders to fight hard for a place that has such little value.

Is the instability in the broader Rasht region (alternately Qarotegin or Gharm) a vital security concern for the government of Tajikistan? The ICG definitely feels so. Since 2008 the Tajik government has been attempting to assert a higher level of control over the region. Basically, since the end of 1992 the government of Tajikistan has been slowly been gaining control over the country. It has had to contend with not just the opposition insurgency, but unhappy allies who have at times taken up arms against the central government. Areas outside central control control have slowly been brought to heel by President Rahmon’s government. And Rasht has been the last of these areas.

1. Rasht: The (Unjustified) Focus of Concern?

I’ll sort through all of these points throughout this post. I’ll spare you the nitpicking and skip the small problems I have with terminology and history. These are the issues I have with the ICG’s assessment of Tajikistan:

Pic from 1993: Back to the bad old days? (via ):

Already I am in broad disagreement with the ICG. The local threat has receded and the over-estimatedВP “external threat” shows little interest in threatening Tajikistan any time sooon. As for the IMU, the pervasive exaggeration of this group is not confined to the analysis provided here by the ICG.

Tajikistan is so vulnerable that a small, localised problem could quickly spiral into a threat to the regimeвІ s existence.

And this line is the shortest summary of the ICG’s worries over Tajikistan:

Tajikistan, by most measures Central AsiaвІ s poorest and most vulnerable state, is now facing yet another major problem: the growing security threat from both local and external insurgencies. After his security forces failed to bring warlords and a small group of young insurgents to heel in the eastern region of Rasht in 2010-2011, President Emomali Rakhmon did a deal to bring a temporary peace to the area. But he may soon face a tougher challenge from the resurgent Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a group with a vision of an Islamist caliphate that is fighting in Afghanistan alongside the Taliban.

The ICG’s assessment is generally pessimistic. The report starts with this paragraph:

International Crisis Group, “Tajikistan: The Changing Insurgent Threats”, Asia Report No. 205 (24 May 2011). .

The International Crisis Group has published a report on Tajikistan:

The Insurgent Threat to Tajikistan: Exaggeration or Accurate Assessment?

Posted by: Christian | May 30, 2011

Conflict and Society in Central Asia 

The Insurgent Threat to Tajikistan: Exaggeration or Accurate Assessment? « Ghosts of Alexander